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INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to issues with federal sentencing, the federal crack 
cocaine-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity is one of the most 
notorious. The 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine disparity took effect 
in 1987.1 This meant that, “[f]or any given quantity of crack, the guideline 
range [was] the same as if the offense had involved 100 times that amount 
in powder cocaine.”2 “[R]epresentatives of the Judiciary, criminal justice 
practitioners, academics, and community interest groups”3 have almost 
universally criticized the drug equivalency ratio, which has been called 
“one of the great stains on our federal criminal justice system.”4 The 100:1 
ratio dramatically increased sentences for two distinct classes of 
individuals: African-Americans and those with low socioeconomic status.5 
When Congress proposed the 100:1 ratio to the United States Sentencing 
Commission,6 it “had no hard evidence . . . to support the contention that 
crack [was] 100 times more potent or dangerous than powder cocaine.”7 
Likewise, the Sentencing Commission also lacked sufficient evidence to 
support the 100:1 ratio that it recommended to Congress.8 
By the mid-1990s, the Sentencing Commission recommended that 
the 100:1 ratio be abandoned, stating that it was unjustified.9 Congress, 
however, refused to act on the Commission’s repeated recommendations 
that the ratio be significantly lowered.10 Until President Barack Obama 
                                                 
 1. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 
3207-2 to 3207-3 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)). 
 2. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 3. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE & FED. SENT. POLY. 2 
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_
Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
 4. Carol Cratty, New Rules Slashing Crack Cocaine Sentences Go into Effect, CNN 
(Nov. 2, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/01/justice/crack-cocaine-sentencing 
(quoting the federal public defender for the Eastern District of Virginia). 
 5. See U.S. SENT. COMM’N, SPECIAL REP. TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED. SENT. 
POLY. at v–viii (2002). 
 6. The United States Sentencing Commission is “an independent agency in the 
judicial branch of the government” that was established to create sentencing policies for the 
federal court system, advise Congress on issues of crime policy, and “collect, analyze, 
research, and distribute a broad array of information on federal crime and sentencing issues.” 
U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N., AN OVERVIEW OF THE U. S. SENT. COMM.’N 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.
pdf. 
 7. United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., 
concurring). 
 8.  See e.g., U.S. SENT. COMM’N, SPECIAL REP. TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FED. 
SENT. POLY. at 195–200 (1995). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough 
World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 114–16 (2009) (“On three separate occasions—in 1995, 1997 
and 2002—the Commission issued a report asserting the following: (1) the 100-to-1 ratio 
was disproportionate to the harms associated with the two drugs; (2) courts could address the 
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signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 into law,11 federal courts disagreed 
about how to appropriately handle the unjustified 100:1 ratio, with some 
federal courts applying reduced 20:112 and 10:113 ratios, while others 
maintained the 100:1 ratio.14 The 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine 
drug equivalence ratio has received (and still receives) a vast amount of 
attention, and has been the subject of much academic analysis and 
discussion.15 
On the other hand, the problem with the current 
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA,” commonly referred to as 
“Ecstasy”)16 drug equivalency ratio is an emerging topic that has largely 
been ignored and under-analyzed.17 Although the two issues are, in some 
ways, distinguishable,18 both the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio and 
the former 100:1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine ratio are unjustified; 
they are both the products of an incomplete and improper analysis of 
scientific data and the relative social harms of trafficking and usage.19 The 
                                                                                                                 
harms associated with crack through specific non-drug-related enhancements; and (3) crack 
penalties fell disproportionately on lower-level participants, most often African-
Americans.”). 
 11. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; Notice of a 
Temporary, Emergency Amendment to Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 661, 88-02. 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Leroy, 373 F.Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Wisc. 2005). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp.2d 553, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: 
Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2531 (2010); Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Fed. Cocaine Sentencing Policy Following the 1995 
Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness & Just Punishment, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 347 (1998); 
Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, & Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a 
Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233 (1996). 
 16. JULIE HOLLAND, ECSTASY: THE COMPLETE GUIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT THE 
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MDMA 2 (2001). 
 17. See Jennifer Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Making the Most of the 
Need for Adequate Explanation (July 2010) (revised and updated through Dec. 2011), 
available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/procedure_substance.pdf; 
Amanda Kay, The Agony of Ecstasy: Reconsidering the Punitive Approach to U.S. Drug 
Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2133 (2002); Scott Michelman, & Jay Rorty, Doing 
Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy Disagreements with the Fed. Sentencing 
Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083 (2012). 
 18. While the crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine disparity disproportionately impacted 
African-American defendants, the MDMA drug equivalency ratio has not been shown to 
have such an effect. Some also claim that the Commission’s consideration of empirical data 
and “national experience” regarding the harms of MDMA distinguish the MDMA drug 
equivalency ratio from the crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine ratio. E.g., United States v. 
Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 607 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). The fact that the Commission’s 
decision about MDMA sentencing guidelines was based on a faulty and incomplete analysis 
of empirical data and of the drug’s social harms, however, makes the two issues more 
closely related than they may initially seem. 
 19. With regard to crack cocaine, the Commission’s false findings include: (1) that 
crack cocaine had identical physiological and psychoactive effects as powder cocaine; 
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Sentencing Commission failed to fulfill its proper institutional role when 
recommending both the MDMA and the crack cocaine ratios. As a result, 
defendants sentenced under the current MDMA Guidelines, just like 
defendants sentenced under the 1987 crack cocaine Guidelines, are 
receiving sentences that are “greater than necessary” to adequately protect 
the public, serve as an effective deterrent, and provide sufficient 
retribution.20 
History seems to be repeating itself. Despite the existence of data 
that showed that the 100:1 crack cocaine ratio was unjustified and 
unsupported by objective evidence, the 100:1 ratio remained in place for 
twenty-four years.21 As a result, federal courts began applying different 
ratios. Sentencing uniformity—from one judge to the next, from one 
courthouse to the next—began to suffer. Yet Congress could have 
prevented years of disproportionate and inconsistent sentencing in crack 
cocaine cases by simply amending the 100:1 ratio. Currently, the federal 
courts are again applying inconsistent drug equivalency ratios—but this 
time to cases involving MDMA.22 Sentencing uniformity is, once again, 
suffering. 
This Note analyzes the MDMA drug equivalency ratio under the 
current Guidelines and argues that the ratio is based on incomplete and 
inaccurate information. Part I of this Note provides an overview of the 
United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) and the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). Part II discusses the rise 
of MDMA and the legislative response. It also summarizes the 
Commission’s findings regarding the social and physiological harms of 
MDMA that formed the basis for the Commission’s decision about the 
appropriate MDMA drug equivalency ratio. Part III examines the errors in 
the Commission’s empirical analysis of the harms of MDMA, and in its 
comparison of the social harms of MDMA to the social harms of other 
drugs. It also reviews the currently-unresolved federal district court split 
                                                                                                                 
(2) that crack cocaine use was going to become an epidemic among the nation’s youth; and 
(3) the high level of violence associated with trafficking. See Tyler B. Parks, The Unfairness 
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 1105, 1114 (2012) (citing U.S. SENT. 
COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE & FED. SENT. POLY. E–5 (2002)). Part III of this 
Note will explore the ways in which the Commission’s findings with regard to MDMA were 
inaccurate. 
 20. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (enumerating the purposes to be served by 
sentencing). 
 21. The 100:1 ratio took effect in 1986 and remained unchanged until President 
Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which ultimately resulted in an 18:1 ratio. 
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 
3207-3 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)); Fair Sentencing Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; Notice of a Temporary, Emergency Amendment 
to Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed. Reg. 661, 88-02. 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) 
(applying the standard 1:500 ratio); United States v. McCarthy, No. 09-CR-1136, 2011 WL 
1991146 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011) (applying a 1:200 ratio). 
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over whether to defer to the MDMA drug equivalency ratio set forth in the 
Guidelines. Finally, Part IV calls for a prompt reevaluation of the current 
MDMA-to-marijuana drug equivalency ratio. This Note concludes that a 
reevaluation of the MDMA drug equivalency ratio is necessary to ensure 
horizontal sentencing uniformity, to prevent inefficient use of judicial 
resources, and to ensure that defendants’ sentences are sufficient but not 
greater than necessary, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines 
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are the product of 
Congress’s attempt to ensure uniformity in sentences across the country by 
implementing nationalized rules for federal criminal sentencing. This 
section provides an overview of the Commission and of the Guidelines that 
the Commission promulgated. First, this section discusses the reasons why 
Congress created the Commission. This section then explores the ways in 
which case law has modified the Guidelines and ends with a general 
discussion about the ways in which federal courts currently apply the 
Guidelines. 
1. The Commission 
In 1984, Congress gave the United States Sentencing Commission 
the authority to promulgate the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
through the Sentencing Reform Act.23 The Commission consists of seven 
voting members, at least three of whom must be federal judges.24 Prior to 
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, “[s]tatutes specified 
the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide 
discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for 
how long.”25 Congress was unsatisfied with the broad discretion afforded to 
judges, however. This dissatisfaction largely stemmed from Congress’s 
concern that similarly situated defendants who were convicted of similar 
crimes were receiving substantially different sentences.26 Under the pre-
1984 indeterminate sentencing regime, the length of a defendant’s sentence 
could largely depend upon the sentencing judge, the courthouse or 
                                                 
 23. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–86, 3601–742 
(2012); Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). 
 25. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
 26. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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geographic region in which the defendant was convicted, and even the 
defendant’s race,27 gender,28 or social class.29 
Through the creation of the Commission, Congress aimed to 
achieve two main goals: (1) “uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the 
wide disparity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar 
criminal conduct”30 and (2) “proportionality in sentencing through a system 
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of 
differing severity.”31 In order to achieve both uniformity and 
proportionality in sentencing, the Commission’s responsibilities are: 
(1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the 
federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted 
regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment 
for offenders convicted of federal crimes; (2) to advise and 
assist Congress and the executive branch in the 
development of effective and efficient crime policy; and 
(3) to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad 
array of information on federal crime and sentencing 
issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the 
executive branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners, 
the academic community, and the public.32 
In order to achieve proportionality in sentencing, the Commission is 
specifically tasked with ensuring that federal sentencing “policies and 
practices” fulfill the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Section 
3553(a)(2) requires that a defendant’s sentence be “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary”: 
                                                 
 27. Id. at 316 (Justice O’Connor stating, “Indeed, rather than reflect legally relevant 
criteria these disparities too often were correlated with constitutionally suspect variables 
such as race.”). 
 28. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING, § 1:3, at 9–10 (2d ed. 1991). 
 29. Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Fed. Sentencing: The 
Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 301, 303 (2006). 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(3) (2012) (emphasis added). This 
specifically means that the sentencing guidelines should not result in “unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records” who are convicted of similar 
crimes. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 
 31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 32. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. SENT. COMM’N 1 (2011), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.
pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW] (“The Commission is charged with the ongoing responsibilities 
of evaluating the effects of the sentencing guidelines on the criminal justice system, 
recommending to Congress appropriate modifications of substantive criminal law and 
sentencing procedures, and establishing a research and development program on sentencing 
issues.”). 
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(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner.33 
In an effort to ensure proportionality in sentencing, the Guidelines also 
require sentencing judges to consider “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”34 
The desire to eliminate subjective sentencing decisions led 
Congress to create a Commission that could promulgate Guidelines based 
on objective criteria. Objective assessments about the harms caused by 
different crimes and the effectiveness of sentences necessarily include an 
analysis of empirical data. Scientific data is a necessary component of an 
accurate assessment of the effectiveness of current sentencing regimes. 
Scientific data also provides an objective way to measure the harm inflicted 
by certain offenses.35 Because scientific data is such a critical component of 
proportionate sentencing, an entire department of the Commission is 
dedicated to collecting and analyzing research and data.36 The 
Commission’s “characteristic institutional role” requires the Commission to 
thoroughly analyze scientific data and to base the Guidelines on that 
analysis.37 The Commission is better situated than courts to formulate and 
refine sentencing guidelines precisely because of its unique ability to “base 
its determinations on empirical data and national experience,” combined 
with its “guid[ance] by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.”38 
                                                 
 33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1)(A). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 35. Science alone may not be able to fully and accurately measure the harms caused 
by specific offenses, but science provides an objective baseline from which to start. Less 
measureable harms, such as social harms, can then be added to this baseline. Without an 
objective form of measurement, however, the entire system would be subjective (and 
arguably arbitrary). For an in-depth discussion on the relationship between empirical data 
and sentencing, see Steven L. Chanenson, Sentencing & Data: The Not-So-Odd Couple, 16 
FED. SENT. R. 1 (2003). 
 36. OVERVIEW, supra note 32, at 3. 
 37. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007). 
 38. Id. (citations omitted). 
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2. The Guidelines and Their Evolution 
The Guidelines, as set forth by the Commission, went into effect in 
1987.39 The Guidelines provide a sentencing range40 based on the 
defendant’s “base offense level,” which is determined by the defendant’s 
alleged conduct41 and prior criminal history.42 More serious crimes are 
generally represented by higher base offense levels.43 Likewise, the more 
extensive a defendant’s prior criminal history, the longer the recommended 
sentence.44 When determining the defendant’s sentence, the judge also 
considers factors unique to the individual defendant which are set forth in 
the defendant’s Presentence Investigation Report.45 
The Commission designed the Guidelines’ base offense levels to 
reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s crime. For drug-related 
convictions, however, the defendant’s base offense depends on both the 
type and quantity of the drug involved.46 The Guidelines contain a Drug 
Equivalency Table, which is essentially a conversion table that allows 
judges to convert the quantity of any type of drug into “its equivalent 
quantity of mari[j]uana.”47 This means that, under the Guidelines, 
“marijuana penalties are used as a common standard to which all other 
drugs are related mathematically.”48 
                                                 
 39. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, U.S. SENT. COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2003), available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2003_guidelines/Manual/2003guid.pdf. 
 40. A sentencing range is a range of time for which the defendant must be sentenced 
to prison. 
 41. The appropriate base offense level corresponds with the defendant’s conviction. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1) (2012). “[S]pecific offense 
characteristics,” if applicable to the defendant’s crime, are added to the base offense level. 
Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2). This level is further adjusted based on facts pertaining to the defendant’s 
role in the crime, the harm to or classification of the victim, defendant’s obstruction of 
justice, and the defendant’s “acceptance of responsibility.” Id. §§ 1B1.1(a)(3)–(5). 
 42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(6)–(7); see also id. § 4B1.1 
(2012) (referring to “career offender” status); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2010 GUIDELINES SENT. 
TABLE, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/
Sentencing_Table.pdf [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES TABLE]. 
 43. 2010 GUIDELINES TABLE, supra note 42, at 1. 
 44. Id. 
 45. The presentence investigation report is mandatory pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) 
(2012) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d). The presentence investigation report is compiled by a 
probation officer and contains information about the defendant such as her criminal history 
and financial condition. It also contains information about “any circumstances affecting [her] 
behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentencing,” and an “assessment of the financial, 
social, psychological, and medical impact on, and cost to, any individual against whom the 
offense was committed.” Francis M Dougherty, Sufficiency of Federal Trial Court’s 
Compliance with Requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(1)(A) and 
32(c)(3)(D), 101 A.L.R. FED. 308 § 2 (1991). 
 46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2012). 
 47. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1, nn.10(A), (D). 
 48. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG OFFENSES 
EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 5, n.1 (2001) [hereinafter GUIDELINE 
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The Guidelines were initially mandatory, which meant that federal 
sentencing judges were required to “impose a sentence within the 
applicable Guidelines range.”49 Sentencing judges could not impose a 
sentence above or below the Guidelines range unless the judge found “an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”50 A 
defendant’s individual characteristics and circumstances, such as age, 
education, health, and disadvantaged upbringing, were not a part of 
formulating an appropriate sentence.51 
Although federal judges were initially required to follow the 
Guidelines, the Guidelines became advisory in 2005. As foreshadowed in 
Blakely v. Washington,52 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker, 
held that the application of the federal Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury.53 The violation occurred because the 
sentencing judge increased the defendant’s sentencing range based on his 
finding of facts by a mere preponderance of the evidence.54 Because the 
Guidelines, as being applied, were in violation of the Sixth Amendment, the 
Booker Court stated that the Guidelines would be merely advisory.55 
Acknowledging the importance of horizontal sentencing uniformity, 
however, the Booker Court left the Guidelines themselves intact.56 The 
Court emphasized its desire to preserve Congress’s intent “to provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, while avoiding 
                                                                                                                 
AMENDMENTS]. For example, the five-year penalty for marijuana begins at 100,000 grams. 
The corresponding five-year penalty for powder cocaine is 500 grams. The ‘marijuana 
equivalency’ for powder cocaine is: one gram of powder cocaine equals 200 grams of 
marijuana. In the powder cocaine example, the 500 grams is multiplied by 200 for a result of 
100,000 grams (identical to the five-year marijuana quantity). This value (100,000 grams) 
can then be used to establish the penalty found in the “Drug Quantity Table,” located in U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1. 
 49. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)). 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). The only other circumstance in which an out-of-
range sentence was permitted was when a defendant provided substantial assistance to the 
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
 51. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Fed. 
Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (citing U.S. SENT. COMM’N, U.S. SENT. 
GUIDELINES MANUAL 449 (2009)). 
 52. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that Washington’s 
sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because the 
Guidelines permitted judges to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the Guidelines’ range 
if the judge found “substantial and compelling reasons” to do so. Id. at 299, 305. This 
holding was largely based on a rule previously set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, which 
mandated that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 466, 490 (2000); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 301. 
 53. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 264. 
 56. Id. 
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unwarranted sentencing disparities and maintaining sufficient flexibility to 
permit individualized sentences when warranted.”57 The Court mandated 
that district court judges “consult [the] Guidelines and take them into 
account when sentencing.58 
Shortly after Booker, the Supreme Court held in Rita v. United 
States that appellate courts could “apply a presumption of reasonableness to 
a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”59 The Rita Court specifically stated that “it is fair to assume 
that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of 
sentences that might achieve the objectives of § 3553(a).”60 In Gall v. 
United States, the Supreme Court further clarified that the appellate courts 
must review for an abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the district 
court judge followed the Guidelines’ suggested sentencing range.61 
According to Rita, the appellate court should first ensure that the lower 
court did not make any significant procedural errors.62 The appellate court 
should next consider whether the sentence was substantively reasonable 
under the totality of the circumstances, using an abuse of discretion 
standard of review.63 
Under the advisory Guidelines, judges may deviate from the 
Guidelines and their decisions are reviewed only for an abuse of 
discretion.64 In Kimbrough v. United States, a federal district court judge 
who presided over a case involving crack cocaine ordered a sentence that 
was substantially lower than the Guidelines sentencing range because the 
judge thought that the suggested range was greater than necessary to serve 
the objectives of § 3553(a).65 At the time, there was a 100:1 powder 
cocaine-to-crack cocaine drug equivalency ratio.66 The district court judge’s 
downward departure was not based on factors particular to the defendant, 
but, rather, was based on a policy disagreement with the 100:1 ratio.67 
                                                 
 57. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B)) (internal quotation and editorial marks 
omitted). Booker also required the federal circuit courts to review sentencing appeals for 
“unreasonableness.” 
 58. Id. (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult 
those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”). 
 59. 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Rita also states that a sentencing judge should provide a 
statement of his or her reasons for imposing a sentence. Id. at 356. The length and detail 
required depends on the circumstances of the case; the judge “should set forth enough to 
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned 
basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.” Id. 
 60. Id. at 350. 
 61. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 65. Id. at 92–93. 
 66. Id. at 94. 
 67. Id. at 93. 
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The Supreme Court, emphasizing the advisory nature of the 
Guidelines after Booker, held that the district court judge’s decision to 
deviate from the Guidelines for policy reasons was not an abuse of 
discretion.68 Two years later, in Spears v. United States, the Supreme Court 
further emphasized that Kimbrough was “a recognition of district courts’ 
authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy 
disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized 
determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case.”69 
As it stands today, a sentencing judge may impose a sentence 
outside of the Guidelines for substantive or policy reasons as long as she 
adequately considers the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and briefly explains 
her reasoning.70 Judges can (and do) deviate from Sentencing Guidelines 
ranges for substantive reasons, such as a defendant’s mental health or 
disadvantaged upbringing, and, sometimes, for policy reasons, such as a 
disagreement with the Guidelines.71 Data suggests, however, that the 
majority of judges do not significantly stray from the suggested Guidelines 
range; since the Guidelines became advisory in 2005, the average federal 
criminal sentence has remained virtually the same length.72 Data from 2008 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 111. The Court noted that the current Guidelines as they pertained to crack 
cocaine did not “exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role,” 
adding that the Commission “did not take account of empirical data and national 
experience.” Id. at 109–10 (internal citations omitted) (noting also that “the Commission 
itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity produces disproportionately harsh 
sanctions”). 
 69. 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009). Spears also clarified “that district courts are entitled to 
reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement with those Guidelines.” Id. at 265–66. 
 70. Greater deviations from the Guidelines likely require a more thorough explanation 
for the deviation. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). 
 71. See, e.g., id.; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 72. The average sentence length for federal criminal offenders: 2005=46.3 months; 
2006=51.8 months; 2007 = 51.8 months; 2008=49.6 months; 2009=46.8 months; 2010=44.3 
months; 2011=43 months; 2012=44 months. See U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2005/table13_pre.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2006 
SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_
and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2006/table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 
2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2007/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. 
COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2008), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2008/Table13.pdf; U.S. 
SENT. COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/Table13.
pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2010), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2010/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS 1, tb.l. 13 
(2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2011/Table13.pdf; U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. 
STATS. 1, tbl. 13 (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm. 
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through 2012 about the length of federally imposed sentences relative to the 
length suggested by the Guidelines reveals that most judges have continued 
to adhere to the Guidelines: throughout this five year period, there has only 
been a 7% increase in sentences that fall outside of the Guidelines range,73 
and there has only been a 4.4% increase in non-government sponsored 
sentences74 that fall below the Guidelines range.75 The largest increase—a 
10.2% increase—in sentences that fall outside of the Guidelines range 
occurred between post-Blakely 2004 and post-Booker 2005.76 
The fact that Booker has not made a significant impact on the 
length of the majority of federal criminal sentences likely has several 
causes. The presumption of reasonableness set forth in Rita encourages 
judges to impose within-guidelines sentences because within-guidelines 
sentences are much more likely to be upheld.77 Additionally, the Guidelines 
remain the starting point for determining a federal sentence, which means 
that absent exceptional circumstances, judges typically will impose a 
within-Guidelines sentence.78 
II. THE RISE OF MDMA AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
MDMA has existed for over one hundred years,79 but it was not 
classified as an illegal substance in the United States until 1985,80 and the 
drastic increase in penalties for MDMA-related offenses did not occur until 
2000.81 This section discusses the history of MDMA and its usage in 
                                                 
 73. Sentences within the Guideline range: 2008=59.4%; 2009=56.8%; 2010=55%; 
2011=54.5%; 2012=52.4%. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, 
fig. G (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/2012/FigureG.pdf. [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK fig. G]. 
 74. “Non-government sponsored” means that the below-Guidelines sentence was not 
due to the defendant’s substantial assistance to the prosecutor (§ 5K1.1) or because Early 
Disposition Programs (§ 5K3.1)/ the prosecutor recommended the downward departure. See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5K1.1, 5K3.1 (2012). 
 75. Non-Government Sponsored Below Range Sentences: 2008=13.4%; 2009=16%; 
2010=17.8%; 2011=17.4%; 2012=17.8%. 2012 SOURCEBOOK fig. G, supra note 73 at 1. 
 76. U.S. SENT. COMM’N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT. STATS. 1, fig. G (2005), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/
2005/fig-g-post.pdf (within-Guideline sentences comprise 69.4% of all sentences in 2003, 
72.2% of cases in Pre-Blakely 2004, 71.8% of cases in Post-Blakely 2004, and 70.9% of 
cases in Post-Booker 2005). 
 77. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2007); Mark Osler, The Promise 
of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the Conflict Between Uniformity & 
Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 203, 210 (2012). 
 78. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1233 (2011). 
 79. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 1. 
 80. Kelly M. Smith et. al., Club Drugs: Methylenedioxymethampehetamine, 
Flunitrazepam, Ketamine Hydrochloride, and Y-Hydrooxybutyrate, 59 AM. J. HEALTH – 
SYSTEM PHARMACY 1067, 1070 (2002). 
 81. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-310, §§ 3661–65, (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 290aa-5b); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG 
OFFENSE, EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 2 (2001). 
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America. This section then discusses the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 
2000, which directed the Commission to research the harms of MDMA and 
recommend an appropriate drug equivalency ratio. After detailing the 
Commission’s findings with regard to both social and physiological harms, 
this section concludes with a discussion of the Commission’s decision to 
dramatically increase the drug equivalency ratio for MDMA. 
A. The Rise of MDMA 
MDMA was synthetically created in Germany sometime before 
1912.82 MDMA “significantly increase[s] feelings of anxiety, confusion, 
vigor, friendliness, elation, positive mood and arousal.”83 Beginning in the 
1970s, American psychologists and therapists used MDMA in 
psychotherapy sessions as a way to generate empathy and enhance 
communication and self-introspection.84 In 1985, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) reclassified MDMA as a Schedule I controlled 
substance.85 The DEA justified this reclassification by emphasizing its 
concerns about MDMA’s potential neurotoxicity.86 
MDMA quickly gained popularity in the late 1980s, following 
extensive media coverage of the Congressional hearings regarding the 
rescheduling of MDMA.87 MDMA became prevalent on college campuses 
and was the drug of choice for many young Americans in the rave scene.88 
                                                 
 82. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 1. 
 83. Janelle Van Wel et al., Effects of Acute MDMA Intoxication on Mood & 
Impulsivity: Role of the 5-HT1 Receptors, 7 PLOSONE (2012), available at http://www.
plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0040187#pone.0040187-
Curran1. 
 84. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 3. 
 85. Smith, supra note 80, at 1070. 
 86. Steven B. Karch, A Historical Review of MDMA, 4 OPEN FORENSIC SCI. J. 20, 22 
(2011), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/22847460_A_historical_
review_of_MDMA/file/d912f50b02aeb3eee8.pdf. Neurotoxicity “is the ability to damage or 
destroy neurons (nerve cells) in the brain and/or other parts of the nervous system.” 
JACQUELINE L. LONGE, 2 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CANCER 1032 (3d ed. 2010). 
 87. Karch, supra note 86, at 21 (“The Congressional hearings on MDMA received an 
inordinate amount of media attention. The results might have been expected: demand for 
illicit MDMA exploded and soon it was for sale on college campuses across the United 
States . . . .”); see also Charles S. Grob, Deconstructing Ecstasy: The Politics of MDMA 
Research, 8 ADDICTION RES. 6, 553 (2000), available at http://www.maps.org/w3pb/new/
2000/2000_grob_1139_1.pdf. 
 88. Karch, supra note 86, at 21. Raves are “underground events” that typically feature 
electronic/techno music and all-night dance parties, often taking place in venues such as 
“warehouse[s], open field[s], or empty building[s].” Erin Treacy, The Rave Act: A Specious 
Solution to the Serious Problem of Increased Ecstasy Distribution: Is It Unconstitutionally 
Overbroad?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 229, 234 (2006); see also HOLLAND, supra 
note 16, at 1. A common dictionary definition is, “a large overnight dance party featuring 
techno music and usually involving the taking of mind-altering drugs.” Rave, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rave?show=0&t=
1392251102 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
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Its popularity in the rave scene created concern among legislators, because 
many of the people who attended these raves and used MDMA were under 
the age of twenty five.89 MDMA continued to gain popularity throughout 
the 1990s, and, by the summer of 2000, the DEA estimated that 2,000,000 
MDMA tablets90 were being imported into America every week.91 MDMA 
primarily affects the brain’s levels of serotonin92 and dopamine.93 
Specifically, MDMA blocks the brain’s reuptake of serotonin, while 
inducing the brain to release both serotonin and dopamine.94 Common street 
names for MDMA include “Molly,”95 “Adam,” “rolls,” “beans,” 
“Ecstasy,”96 “E,” “XTC,” and “X.”97 
B. The Congressional Response: The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 
2000 
In response to the quickly-growing popularity of MDMA, Congress 
passed the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, which recommended that 
the United States Sentencing Commission increase penalties for MDMA-
                                                 
 89. Karch, supra note 86, at 21. MDMA use at raves, “where ambient temperatures 
may be high,” also posed further complications because users would “danc[e] for many 
hours without adequate fluid replacement.” HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 2. This increased the 
rates of hyperthermia among MDMA users, which led to some users collapsing or 
convulsing at raves. Some scientists believe, however, that these risks were due less to 
MDMA itself and more to “the circumstances in which [MDMA] is misused.” Id. The fact 
that patients who used MDMA during supervised psychotherapy sessions did not experience 
hyperthermia also supports this conclusion. 
 90. MDMA tablets typically contain about 50–150 milligrams of MDMA. DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUGS OF ABUSE 60 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/
pr/multimedia-library/publications/drug_of_abuse.pdf. The tablets themselves typically 
weigh 250–300 milligrams. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 16. The street value 
of an MDMA tablet in 2000 averaged twenty-six dollars in Tennessee. NAT’L DRUG INTEL. 
CTR., TENNESSEE DRUG ASSESSMENT (May 2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/
pubs1/1017/odd.htm. 
 91. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 18–19. 
 92. “Serotonin has different inhibitory roles in several parts of the brain, and serotonin 
concentrations have been reported to modify mood, appetite, memory, and learning ability.” 
LARRY L. MAI, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF HUMAN BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 481 (2005). 
 93. Id. at 153 (“Dopamine is a key neurotransmitter and basal ganglia inhibitor, and is 
involved in several left-hemisphere skills critical to language and thought. Dopamine also 
plays a role in counteracting hyperthermia during endurance activity . . . .”); HOLLAND, 
supra note 16, at 18–19. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Sara Bellum, Meet Molly: The Truth About MDMA, NAT’L DRUG INST. ON DRUG 
ABUSE (May 1, 2012), http://teens.drugabuse.gov/blog/post/meet-molly-truth-about-ecstasy. 
 96. Christina L. Sein, The Agony & the Ecstasy: Preserving First Amendment 
Freedoms in the Government’s War on Raves, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 165 (2002) 
(discussing that ecstasy is typically cut with cocaine and other drugs, although when MDMA 
is a large part of ecstasy, the drug quantities are sentenced under MDMA). 
 97. MDMA, THE VAULTS OF EROWID, http://www.erowid.org/chemicals/mdma/mdma.
shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
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related offenses.98 Section 3(b)(1) of the Act specifically directed the 
Commission to “review and amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
provide for increased penalties such that those penalties are comparable to 
base offense levels for offenses involving any methamphetamine mixture,” 
which, at that time, had a 1:2000 gram ratio to marijuana.99 
Pursuant to Congress’s orders, the Sentencing Commission 
reviewed “the available scientific and popular literature on MDMA,” and 
requested input from agencies and organizations such as the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Public and Community Defenders.100 Upon 
receiving requests for a public hearing from the general public and from 
public organizations such as the National Association for Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, the Commission delayed voting on the amendment in order to 
hold the requested public hearing.101 Prior to the public hearing, the 
Commission planned to recommend a 1:1000 drug equivalency ratio, which 
was identical to the drug equivalency ratio of heroin.102 
During its decision process, the Commission received and 
considered hundreds of written submissions “from a diverse array of 
constituents including clinicians, physicians, psychologists, academic 
researchers, users, defense attorneys, and other interests groups.”103 The 
Commission considered information from the DEA about increasing 
trafficking patterns and challenges faced by law enforcement, as well as 
information from the National Institute on Drug Abuse about the 
“pharmacological effects and health hazards associated with MDMA.”104 
The Commission also considered information about the increase of MDMA 
use among the nation’s youth from institutions and organizations such as 
the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration.105 
C. The Commission’s Findings 
The Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 specifically directed the 
Commission to consider and evaluate the following dangers associated with 
MDMA use: 
                                                 
 98. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-310, §§ 3661–65, (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 290aa–5b); U.S. SENT. COMM’N, REP. TO THE CONGRESS: MDMA DRUG OFFENSE, 
EXPLANATION OF RECENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS 2 (2001) [hereinafter MDMA REPORT]. 
 99. Children’s Health Act of 2000 § 3664(b)(1). 
 100. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 3–4, 17. 
 101. Id. at 4 (discussing that at that time the Commission had set forth a preliminary 
proposal that “would have set the penalties for MDMA trafficking equal to the penalties for 
heroin trafficking”). 
 102. Id. at 4–5. 
 103. Id. at 4 (noting that the “volume of the public comment received on the proposed 
changes to the guidelines for MDMA trafficking far exceed[ed] that for any issue this 
Commission ha[d] addressed since taking office in November 1999”). 
 104. Id. at 3–4. 
 105. Id. at 13–15. 
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(A) the rapidly growing incidence of abuse of [MDMA] 
and the threat to public safety that such abuse poses; 
(B) the recent increase in the illegal importation of 
[MDMA]; 
(C) the young age at which children are beginning to use 
[MDMA]; 
(D) the fact that [MDMA is] frequently marketed to youth; 
(E) the large number of doses per gram of [MDMA]; and 
(F) any other factor . . . .106 
With regard to the rapid increase of MDMA-use and the resulting 
threat to the public, the Commission found persuasive statistics that 
showed skyrocketing MDMA-related emergency room visits 
between 1994 and 2000.107 As of 1994, there were 250 MDMA-
related emergency room visits, but as of 1999 there were 2,850 
MDMA-related emergency room visits.108 
The Commission also expressed concern regarding the “recent 
increase in the illegal importation of [MDMA].”109 To support its concern, 
the Commission referenced the spike in the amount MDMA that the DEA 
seized within the past year: the DEA seized one million MDMA tablets in 
1999, but seized three million MDMA tablets in 2000.110 The Commission 
also cited U.S. Customs Service’s seizure of over nine million MDMA 
tablets in 2000, which was a large increase from the three and a half million 
tablets seized in 1999, and the mere 400,000 tablets seized in 1997.111 
With regard to the young age of first-time MDMA users, the 
Commission expressed particular concern about the “sharp increase in 
MDMA use among all grade levels, as well as young adults in their early 
                                                 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. Id. at 11 (citing OFF. OF APPLIED STUD., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES ADMIN. (SAMHSA), CLUB DRUGS, THE DAWN (DRUG-ABUSE WARNING 
NETWORK) REP. 2 (2000)). 
 108. Id. at 11. The Commission also mentioned the harm to user, which is discussed in 
scientific detail elsewhere in the report (and is discussed within this Note later in this 
section). 
 109. Id. at 3. 
 110. Id. at 12 (citing Statement of Donnie Marshall, Administrator, DEA, before the 
U.S. Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control regarding America at Risk: The Ecstasy 
Threat, 2 (March 21, 2001)). 
 111. Id. (citing Statement by Chuck Winwood, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs 
Serv., before the U.S. Senate Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control regarding America at Risk: 
The Ecstasy Threat, 1 (March 21, 2001)). 
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twenties.”112 The Commission also noted that, as of 2000, more American 
teenagers had used MDMA than heroin.113 
Along the same lines, the Commission also worried about the fact 
that MDMA was being marketed toward a very young demographic.114 
Specifically, the Commission was concerned with the ease of access to 
MDMA, the perception among the youth demographic that MDMA carried 
a “low risk of harm,” MDMA’s “reputation as a ‘feel good’ drug,”115 and 
the fact that MDMA was being marketed under popular brand-names such 
as “Mercedes-Benz” or “Smurfs.”116 
Although Congress directed the Commission to consider “the large 
number of doses per gram of [MDMA],”117 the Commission stated that this 
type of information was inappropriate within the context of MDMA.118 
Instead, the Commission “found more important and persuasive the fact 
that, because the pills are quite small, large numbers of doses can be 
transported and imported at one time.”119 
Congress also told the Commission to consider “any other 
appropriate factors.”120 In response, the Commission considered the 
“relevant legislative history” by reviewing testimony from Congressional 
hearings at which “witnesses from the Commission, [representatives of] law 
enforcement agencies, researchers, and former MDMA users testified.” 121 
The Commission noted that, mere months before Congress passed the 
Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000, “legislation was emerging from 
both Houses of Congress that would have required the Commission to 
increase MDMA penalties” to a level comparable to those for 
methamphetamine mixtures.122 
The Commission also considered feedback from the public.123 The 
Commission’s report highlights the extensive amount of public comment it 
                                                 
 112. Id. at 13 (citing Lloyd Johnston et al., “Ecstasy” Use Rises Sharply Among Teens 
in 2000: Use of Many Other Drugs Steady but Significant Declines Are Reported for Some, 
UNIV. OF MICH. NEWS & INFO. SERV. (Dec. 14, 2000)), available at http://www.monitoring
thefuture.org/. 
 113. Id. at 14 (citing P’SHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AM., P’SHIP ATTITUDE TRACKING STUDY: 
SPRING 2000, TEENS IN GRADES 7 THROUGH 12, 11 (2000)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 15. 
 116. Id. (citing CEWG, NIH, NIDA, EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE, 1 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMUNITY EPIDEMIOLOGY WORKING GRP. 76, 79 (2000)). 
 117. Id. at 3. 
 118. Id. at 16 (“Although the Commission was required to consider the large dosage 
amount per gram of MDMA, the Commission found this information to be inaccurate.”). 
 119. Id. Images of MDMA tablets can be found at Ecstasy MDMA, DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pr/multimedia-library/image-gallery/
images_ecstasy.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2014), and at DRUGS OF ABUSE, supra note 90, at 
58. 
 120. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 3. 
 121. Id. at 16. 
 122. Id. at 16, n.58. 
 123. Id. at 17. 
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received while it was deciding how to amend the penalties for MDMA 
offenses: “Respondents included clinicians, physicians, psychologists, 
academic researchers, users, defense attorneys, and other interest groups,” 
as well as organizations such as “the Department of Justice, and the Federal 
Public and Community Defenders.”124 
Striving to make the penalty for MDMA-related offenses consistent 
with the trafficking structure set forth by the DEA, which “generally 
attempt[s] to distinguish between high level ‘kingpin’ distributors and low 
level, local distributors,”125 the Commission considered the functional roles 
of offenders in the MDMA distribution network.126 
Finally, the Commission considered “collateral consequences” such 
as whether violence, secondary health consequences, or environmental 
harms were caused by MDMA trafficking and consumption.127 The 
Commission did not find any suggestion that “substantial violence” was 
associated with MDMA trafficking, and stated that “users of MDMA rarely 
commit crimes to support their consumption pattern.”128 The Commission 
also did not find any negative secondary health consequences that are 
sometimes associated with illegal drug use, such as contracting diseases 
from contaminated needles.129 Finally, since the majority of MDMA is 
imported from other countries, MDMA did “not pose the same risks to the 
environment as methamphetamine and amphetamine production.”130 
D. The Commission’s Findings: The Empirical Basis 
In making its recommendation to Congress, the Commission 
reviewed and relied upon empirical data to determine the physiological 
effects and harms of MDMA. The Commission noted that MDMA caused 
physical effects such as “an enhanced sense of pleasure and self-
confidence, increased energy, feelings of peacefulness, acceptance, 
empathy, closeness with others, and a desire to be touched.”131 The 
Commission was concerned, however, about its conclusion that MDMA 
                                                 
 124. Id. at 17. 
 125. Id. at 18. The functional roles for MDMA set forth by the DEA are as follows: 
50,000 to 100,000 pills indicate an importer; 5,000 to 10,000 pills indicate an upper- or 
middle-level distributor; 500 to 1,000 pills indicate a local distributor; 50 to 100 pills 
indicate a hand-to-hand dealer at a rave. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 16, 18. 
 128. Id. at 19. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. Although there are no conclusive estimates of amphetamine production in the 
United States, a significant amount of amphetamines available in the United States is 
domestically produced. NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., NAT’L DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 2005 
(Feb. 2005). 
 131. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 7 (citing NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L 
INST. OF HEALTH, NIDA NOTES, FACTS ABOUT MDMA (ECSTASY), PUB. NO. 99-3478, at 15 
(1999)). 
2014] FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES’ TREATMENT OF MDMA 285 
also produced negative effects such as “increased heart rate and blood 
pressure, restlessness, jaw clenching, changes in body temperature 
regulation, increased body temperature, muscle tension, next day hangover, 
and a strong urge to repeat use,” despite the fact that MDMA is not 
physically addictive.132 The Commission’s report reveals that the 
Commission was highly influenced by concerns about MDMA’s 
neurotoxicity.133 Based on the scientific reports it reviewed, the 
Commission believed that neurotoxicity would result in permanent harm to 
the brain that would affect important cognitive functions, such as 
memory.134 
The Commission formed conclusions about the harms of MDMA, 
despite the fact that scientists had come to differing conclusions about both 
the physical and emotional harms of MDMA in its report: “[M]uch, 
although not all, of the research [found] a range of physical and emotional 
hazards associated with [MDMA] use.”135 Despite acknowledging that 
“[t]he potential toxicity to serotonin neurons . . . ha[d] been the subject of 
some disagreement,” the Commission also concluded that MDMA was 
neurotoxic. 136 Finally, the Commission concluded that MDMA caused 
permanent physical harm to the user’s brain, despite admitting that “the 
brain’s elasticity and redundancy may mean that any neurotoxicity caused 
by the drug may not be meaningful,” and that “[a]nother point of 
controversy surrounding the MDMA research literature is whether loss and 
corresponding impairment of these serotonin sites is permanent.”137 So, 
notwithstanding the acknowledged scientific uncertainty, the Commission 
based its recommendations to Congress on its conclusions about the 
physical, neurotoxic harms of MDMA. 
E. The Commission’s Decision 
Ultimately, the Commission declined to follow Congress’s 
recommendation to treat MDMA as harshly as methamphetamine, and 
decided against its initial plan to treat MDMA as harshly as heroin.138 The 
Commission unanimously decided on a marijuana equivalency of 500 
grams,139 which was less than heroin’s equivalency ratio of 1:1000 grams, 
but more than powder cocaine’s equivalency ratio of 1:200 grams.140 The 
                                                 
 132. Id. (citing MDMA Effects, THE VAULTS OF EROWID, http://www.erowid.org/
chemicals/mdma/mdma_effects.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2014)). 
 133. Id. at 8. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 136. Id. at 8. 
 137. Id. at 9–10. 
 138. Id. at 4–5. 
 139. That is, a 1:500 ratio of MDMA to marijuana. Id. at 5. 
 140. Id. at 4–5. The emergency amendment was promulgated on March 20, 2001, and 
the permanent amendment was promulgated on April 6, 2001. 
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Commission justified its decision by comparing the harms of MDMA to the 
harms of both cocaine and heroin. The Commission chose a lesser ratio 
than the ratio for heroin because: 
(1) there are many more heroin cases in the federal system 
than MDMA cases, (2) heroin is more addictive than 
MDMA, (3) heroin has many more emergency room visits 
and deaths associated with its use than MDMA because, 
unlike MDMA which generally is taken orally, heroin is 
injected, (4) heroin has more violence associated with both 
its users and distribution system than MDMA, in part 
because MDMA users typically do not resort to violence to 
support their drug use, and (5) heroin causes greater 
secondary health effects, such as the spread of HIV and 
hepatitis, because it is injected.141 
The Commission chose a greater ratio than the ratio for powder 
cocaine, determining that MDMA was more harmful than cocaine, because 
“(1) unlike MDMA, powder cocaine is not neurotoxic, (2) powder cocaine 
is not as aggressively marketed to youth in the same manner as MDMA, 
and (3) powder cocaine is only a stimulant, but MDMA acts as both a 
stimulant and a hallucinogen.”142 
The Commission believed that a 1:500 MDMA-to-marijuana ratio 
was appropriate because of “the unique pharmacological and physiological 
harms of ecstasy, the fact that the drug is aggressively marketed to and used 
by our youth, and its importation and trafficking pattern.”143 This increased 
ratio resulted in a 115% increase in MDMA-related prison sentences, which 
increased the average prison sentence of an offender from thirty-four 
months to seventy-three months.144 The ratio currently remains at 1:500, 
and has not been reevaluated since 2001. 
III. CORE PROBLEMS WITH THE MDMA DRUG EQUIVALENCY RATIO 
The Commission overstated the harms of MDMA in its report, 
which resulted in a drug equivalency ratio that is disproportionate to the 
risks and harms of MDMA. This section analyzes the science on which the 
Commission relied when making a decision about an appropriate MDMA 
drug equivalency ratio, pointing out the ways in which that science was 
incomplete and likely inaccurate. Next, this section discusses the failure of 
the Commission to adequately compare MDMA to other drugs with regard 
to the social harms caused by using and trafficking MDMA. This section 
                                                 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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concludes by discussing the currently unresolved split amongst the federal 
circuit courts regarding whether to defer to the Commission’s MDMA 
equivalency ratio. 
A. Empirical Problems with the Ratio 
Much of the science on which the Commission’s 2001 decision was 
based is likely inaccurate. The science on which the Commission’s decision 
was based suffered from uncontrolled extraneous variables, and many 
studies were conducted by a scientist who employed questionable—if not 
entirely dishonest—methods. Further, recent science shows that the claim 
that MDMA is neurotoxic may be incorrect. More importantly, however, 
modern science does not support the Commission’s beliefs about the extent 
of MDMA’s physiological harms. The Commission also failed to consider 
valid scientific evidence about MDMA’s cardiotoxicity.145 The combination 
of these mistakes renders the Commission’s 2001 decision unjustified, and 
creates the need for the Commission to reevaluate the current MDMA drug 
equivalency ratio. 
1. The Commission’s Reliance on Unsound Science 
As discussed in Section II, the Commission relied on several 
different scientific studies in an attempt to determine the nature and extent 
of the harms caused by MDMA use. The Commission’s reliance on these 
scientific studies, however, is problematic. Many of the studies on which 
the Commission relied were conducted by a scientist who later had to 
withdraw much of his work on MDMA. This calls into question the 
credibility and integrity of almost all of the scientific studies cited in the 
Commission’s 2001 decision. Further, many of the scientific studies that the 
Commission cites are scientifically unsound. The studies were performed 
on a variety of non-human subjects, and extraneous variables were not 
adequately controlled for. 
The Commission’s decision about the extent of MDMA’s 
physiological harms was highly influenced by its concerns about MDMA’s 
neurotoxicity—specifically MDMA’s effect on serotonin transmitters 
(“SERT”)146 and potential permanent harm resulting therefrom.147 A 
significant amount of the scientific research that the Commission used to 
justify its concerns about neurotoxicity, however, is untrustworthy. One of 
                                                 
 145. According to the National Cancer Institute, cardiotoxicity is “toxicity that affects 
the heart.” Cardiotoxicity includes “a direct effect of [a] drug on the heart [and] also an 
indirect effect” due to increased blood flow or blood clot formation in blood vessels. 
I. Brana & J. Tabernero, Cardiotoxicity, 21 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY vii173–vii179 (2010). 
 146. Serotonin transmitters take up and inactivate serotonin. LARRY R. SQUIRE, 
FUNDAMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 143 (3d ed. 2008). 
 147. Id. at 8. 
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the main researchers involved in many of these studies, George Ricaurte, 
has employed methods that call into question his integrity as an objective 
scientist. At the time of the Commission’s decision, Ricaurte’s work was 
the subject of severe peer criticism.148 Scientists criticized his 
methodologies and failure to account for extraneous variables and 
extenuating circumstances.149 Additionally, several medical and research 
professionals publically criticized Ricaurte’s work during the 
Commission’s hearings.150 
Despite this criticism, however, the Commission attempted to 
justify its reliance on the controversial scientist’s studies in two different 
ways. First, the Commission stated that Ricaurte was a “leading researcher 
in MDMA toxicity studies.”151 Ricaurte was the main researcher funded by 
the government to research MDMA neurotoxicity, receiving millions of 
dollars in funding between 1989 and 2002.152 Second, the Commission 
claimed that, because Ricaurte’s “work has appeared in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals of excellent reputation,” the “method[s] of peer review 
and dissemination” make the studies credible.153 
Since the Commission’s 2001 decision, Ricaurte has been 
surrounded by scandal. In 2003, Ricaurte was forced to retract a study 
published in Science that concluded that the amount of MDMA typically 
consumed by a recreational user in a single night could cause permanent 
brain damage.154 The $1.3 million study had used methamphetamine instead 
of MDMA, rendering all of the results invalid.155 Ricaurte had to withdraw 
four additional papers, because methamphetamine was also used instead of 
MDMA in four other studies performed in his lab.156 Although Ricaurte 
stands behind his conclusions about the harms of MDMA, numerous well-
respected scientists have made allegations that Ricaurte’s work is unsound. 
Ricaurte has been accused of “playing games with his data” to make drugs 
                                                 
 148. Id. at 8, n.15. 
 149. See Grob, supra note 87, at 563–66, 573–79. Specific methodological problems 
will be discussed later in this section. 
 150. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.15. Ricaurte’s studies were “severely 
criticized by several medical/research professionals who publically commented to the 
Commission during its review of the MDMA penalties.” Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Ilsa Jerome, NIDA & NCRR Funding for Ricaurte & McCann, MAPS (2004), 
available at http://www.maps.org/mdma/ricaurtefunding.pdf (discussing that Ricaurte and 
McCann, Ricaurte’s wife with whom he frequently works, received over $14.6 million 
dollars for MDMA and MDMA-related research between 1989 and 2002). 
 153. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.15 (this proposition was apparently 
supported by “at least one critic” who is not named in the Commission’s report). 
 154. Donald G. McNeil Jr., Research on Ecstasy Is Clouded by Errors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2003, at F1. 
 155. Id. The monkeys in the study were injected with overdoses of methamphetamine, 
killing two of the 10 monkeys. 
 156. Id. (Ricuarte claiming the labels on vials he bought in 2000 had been “somehow 
switched”). 
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look bad in order to win more federal grants157 and “running a cottage 
industry showing that everything under the sun is neurotoxic.”158 Subjects 
from Ricaurte’s studies have also reported that Ricaurte used unsound 
methodologies, such as administering memory tests while subjects are jet-
lagged and being told “what not to admit . . . if they wanted to be in the 
[compensated] study.”159 For obvious reasons, Ricaurte’s credibility has 
been tarnished, making the integrity and reliability of his scientific studies 
even more questionable. 
The Commission relied heavily on George Ricaurte’s scientific 
research in its report to Congress.160 Although the Commission’s report to 
Congress cites the work of six scientists161 to support the conclusion that 
MDMA is neurotoxic and has long-lasting effects on SERT, almost half of 
the studies to which the Commission cites were performed by George 
Ricaurte.162 Further, although Ricaurte was not always the lead or sole 
scientist who conducted the studies to which the Commission cited, he was 
involved in every single study.163 The Commission relied on Ricaurte’s 
animal-based studies to support the conclusion that MDMA users who 
consumed normal recreational doses of MDMA risked suffering lasting and 
significant neurotoxic effects like damage to SERT nerve fibres164 resulting 
in “significant impairments in visual and verbal memory.”165 The 
Commission also relied on these studies to support the conclusion that 
MDMA impairs working memory,166 which is critical to cognitive 
reasoning, attention, and comprehension.167 In summary, essentially all of 
                                                 
 157. Id. at F4 (quoting Dr. Julie Holland, a professor of psychiatry at New York 
University). 
 158. Id. (quoting Dr. Richard J. Wurtman, a “prominent clinician at Harvard and 
M.I.T.”). 
 159. Id. (summarizing two subjects’ descriptions of their participation in a 1996 study). 
 160. See GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 8–10. The section also cites two 
scientific studies (by George Battaglia and James P. O’Callaghan) that do not support the 
conclusion that MDMA has lasting neurotoxic effects, but it dedicates almost no discussion 
to these studies and seemingly dismisses them. Id. at 8, 10 nn.14, 22. 
 161. Id. at 8–10 nn.13, 15–21, 23. (K.M. Hegadoren, Meltem Demirkian, George 
Ricaurte, Robart Mathias, Euphrosyne Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, and G. Hatzidimitriou). 
 162. Id. at 8–10. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 8–9 nn.16-17 (citing George Ricaurte et al., (+ –) 3,4-
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (‘Ecstasy’)-Induced Neurotoxicity: Studies in Animals, 42 
NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 5–10 (2000)). 
 165. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing ROBERT MATHIAS, NIDA NOTES, “ECSTASY” 
DAMAGES THE BRAIN & IMPAIRS MEMORY IN HUMANS, PUB. NO. 99-3478, 10–11(1999)). 
Although the Commission cites to Mathias, a secondary source, the information referred to 
ultimately is drawn from the following study: U.D. McCann et al., Positron Emission 
Tomographic Evidence of Toxic Effect of MDMA (“Ecstasy”) on Brain Serotonin Neurons 
in Human Beings, 352 LANCET 1433 (1998) (G.A. Ricaurte is the fourth author of the study). 
 166. MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 9–10 n.21. 
 167. Nelson Cowan, What Are the Differences Between Long-term, Short-term, and 
Working Memory?, 169 PROG. IN BRAIN RES. 323 (2008). 
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the Commission’s conclusions about the physical harms of MDMA are 
based on Ricaurte’s studies. 
In addition to Ricuarte’s credibility problems, the scientific studies 
upon which the Commission relied were rife with methodological errors. 
Many of the scientific studies used by the Commission in forming its 2001 
decision cannot adequately establish a causal relationship to MDMA and 
harms to human users. These studies used animals rather than humans as 
subjects.168 In order to accurately predict MDMA-related harms for 
humans, animal-based studies must use doses of MDMA that are 
functionally equivalent to recreational doses of MDMA.169 Many scientists 
have concerns, however, “as to whether the administered dose of MDMA 
typically used to cause neurotoxicity in [animals] allows any translational 
projections to be made as to the doses required to produce similar damage 
in the brains of humans following recreational use of [MDMA].”170 These 
animal-based studies have also been criticized as flawed, because they 
neglected to consider and account for “interspecies differences in . . . drug 
metabolism.”171 Specifically problematic is Ricaurte’s use of monkeys, 
which appear to “have far more sensitivity to [MDMA]’s neurochemical 
effects, and even at relatively low doses sustain persistent measurable 
effects.”172 
Yet another methodological concern stems from the failure to 
control for extraneous variables such as impure MDMA and simultaneous 
polydrug use173 by subjects during the studies. Even at the time of the 
Commission’s decision, it was clear that establishing a scientifically sound 
causal relationship between physiological harms and MDMA would be 
challenging174 because of the frequent adulteration of MDMA tablets.175 
“By the mid-1990s, the average MDMA tablet contained no more than forty 
percent MDMA.”176 Further, MDMA users regularly used other illicit drugs 
                                                 
 168. See, e.g., G. Hatzidimitriou et al., Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the 
Forebrain of Monkeys Treated with MDMA Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing 
Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5096 (1999) cited in MDMA REPORT, supra note 
98, at 10 n.23. 
 169. A.R. Green et al., MDMA: On the Translation from Rodent to Human Dosing, 204 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 375 (2009). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (stating that Ricaurte’s use of interspecies scaling has never shown to be valid 
for MDMA). 
 172. Grob, supra note 87, at 549. 
 173. A common dictionary definition of “polydrug” is, “of, relating to, or being the 
abuse of more than one drug especially when illicit.” Polydrug, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/polydrug (last visited Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 174. It was also clear that the causal relationship had not yet been established to any 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty. 
 175. Karch, supra note 86, at 21.; see also HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71. 
 176. Karch, supra note 86, at 21 (stating the remaining portion of the tablets typically 
contained other ingredients such as amphetamines, aspirin, caffeine, ephedrine, and even 
other hallucinogens); see also HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71. 
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simultaneously with MDMA.177 This frequent polydrug use was not 
properly accounted for in studies on which the Commission relied to 
conclude that MDMA was neurotoxic.178 In at least one study, a drug-
history questionnaire of the subjects was completely absent.179 Other 
methodological problems include selecting subjects who were “unarguably 
heavy users of [MDMA],”180 and a failure to remove outliers.181 
2. Modern Science: MDMA May Not Be Neurotoxic 
Current empirical data about MDMA and its effects is still not 
entirely settled or conclusive. In fact, even within the past few years, 
“despite a plethora of human and animal studies spanning more than two 
decades, experts in psychopharmacology cannot reach consensus, with 
some recently claiming MDMA to be largely innocuous and others 
proclaiming a clear link between MDMA use and psychopathology.”182 
Despite the fact that science has not provided conclusive answers to 
questions about the harms of MDMA, modern research indicates that the 
Commission very likely overstated the harms of MDMA. 
At the time of its decision in 2001, the Commission acknowledged 
that “the potential toxicity to [SERT] . . . ha[d] been the subject of some 
disagreement.183 The Commission failed, however, to dedicate any 
significant amount of discussion to both sides of the disagreement.184 The 
Commission’s report cites, in a mere footnote, a scientific study reporting 
an “absence of certain chemical markers indicative of neurotoxicity,” which 
was performed by the head of the Molecular Neurotoxicology Laboratory, 
Toxicology, and Molecular Biology Branch of The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.185 The Commission drastically understated the 
extent of the conflicting scientific information when it stated that there was 
                                                 
 177. HOLLAND, supra note 16, at 71. 
 178. See GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 9 n.18; Grob, supra note 87, at 
576–77. 
 179.  Grob, supra note 87, at 576–77 (“Essential data characterizing these two groups, 
however, is missing. Although investigators say they administered a drug-history 
questionnaire to their subjects, these critical results are absent from the report.”). 
 180.  Id. (reporting results from these groups were then extrapolated to “occasional (or 
one-time) low dose MDMA [use]”). 
 181. Grob, supra note 87, at 577. “Indeed, if one removes the one outlier subject and 
the 15 controls who had been included to weight the correlative curve, a new regression 
analysis reveals no statistically significant correlation between MDMA use and transporter 
density.” Id. 
 182. Murray R.Thompson et al., The Psychopharmacology of MDMA, in THE HEALTH 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF “ECSTASY” (MDMA) USE (Louisa Degenhardt & Wayne 
Hall eds., 2010). 
 183. See MDMA REPORT, supra note 98, at 8 n.14. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 8 (citing James P. O’Callaghan, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
Defining Neurotoxicity: Lessons from MDMA & Other Amphetamines (2001)(emphasis 
added)). This study was submitted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission on March 21, 2001. 
292 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1: 267 
merely “some disagreement” over conclusions about MDMA’s 
neurotoxicity.186 By 2001, many studies suggested that MDMA may not be 
neurotoxic. For example, a 1995 study showed that MDMA neurotoxicity 
was “dependent upon high core temperatures,” and that avoiding 
hyperthermic states reliably blocked SERT damage.187 This means that 
when an MDMA user’s core body temperature is normal (i.e., not elevated 
by excessive physical exertion or a warm, poorly ventilated environment), 
there will not likely be any neurotoxic effects from MDMA use. 
Additionally, a 1998 study showed no statistically significant correlation 
between MDMA use and SERT density (i.e., neurotoxicity) when the one 
outlier subject was removed.188 
Although modern science cannot yet definitely answer every 
question about MDMA’s physical harms, it has provided further 
clarification. A 2011 study that was designed to assess MDMA’s 
neurotoxicity failed to find any “marked residual cognitive effects in 
ecstasy users.”189 The study was carefully designed to minimize any 
“possible sources of bias” and “limitations found in many prior 
investigations.”190 The study utilized a proper control group and excluded 
participants who had “significant life-time exposure to other illicit drugs or 
alcohol.”191 It also required MDMA-using participants to “be members of 
the ‘rave’ subculture,” and it thoroughly drug tested all participants to 
exclude any possible unreported substance abuse.192 A 1999 and 2002 
study, both of which used PET scans to examine neurotoxic effects on the 
dopamine systems of MDMA users, did not find any neurotoxic changes—
temporary or permanent—in the users’ brains.193 
                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. Grob, supra note 87, at 570 n.152 (citing M. I. Colado et al., The Hyperthermic 
and Neurotoxic Effects of ‘Ecstasy’ (MDMA) and 3,4 Methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA) 
in the Dark Agouti (DA) Rat, a Model of the CYP2D6 Poor Metabolizer Phenotype, 115 
BRITISH J. PHARMACOLOGY 1281 (1995); H.W. Broening et al., Age-Dependent Sensitivity of 
Rats to the Long-Term Effects of the Sertonergic Neurotoxicant 3,4 
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) Correlates with the Magnitude of the MDMA-
Induced Thermal Response,275 J. PHARMACOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL THERAPEUTICS 
325(1995)). 
 188. Grob, supra note 87, at 570 (referring to the PET scan study discussed on page 9 
of the MDMA report, Grob states, “Indeed, if one removes the one outlier subject and the 15 
controls who had been included to weight the correlative curve, a new regression analysis 
reveals no statistically significant correlation between MDMA use and transporter density.”). 
 189. John H. Halpern et al., Residual Neurocognitive Features of Long-Term Ecstasy 
Users with Minimal Exposure to Other Drugs, 106 ADDICTION 777 (April 2011). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. L. Reneman et al., Use of Amphetamine by Recreational Users of Ecstasy 
(MDMA) Is Associated with Reduced Striatal Dopamine Transporter Densities: A 
[123l]beta-CIT SPECT Study—Preliminary Report, 159 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (BERLIN) 
335 (2002); D. M. Semple et al., Reduced In Vivo Binding to the Serotonin Transporter in 
the Cerebral Cortex of MDMA (‘Ecstasy’) Users, 175 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 63 (1999). 
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Not all studies conclude that MDMA is not neurotoxic;194 however, 
the meticulously well-designed studies that have not found any evidence of 
neurotoxicity make it likely that the Commission’s conclusion that MDMA 
causes significant neurotoxic damage to MDMA user’s brains is incorrect. 
At a minimum, these studies demonstrate the need for the Commission to 
reevaluate the physical harms of MDMA and to implement a drug 
equivalency ratio reflective of the seriousness of those harms. 
3. Modern Science: MDMA Likely Does Not Cause Significant or Lasting 
Neurological Harm 
As previously discussed, modern science cannot yet definitively 
answer the question of whether MDMA is neurotoxic. Despite modern 
science not being completely settled, however, recent studies have made 
progress and have clarified details about the harms caused by MDMA use 
and details about the extent and permanence of those harms. A vast amount 
of current scientific studies conclude that even if MDMA is neurotoxic, it is 
highly likely the resulting neurological harm to the user is impermanent and 
insignificant. 
As previously mentioned, the Commission relied on Ricaurte’s 
animal-based studies to conclude that MDMA users who consumed normal 
recreational doses of MDMA risked suffering permanent, significant 
neurotoxic effects like damage to SERT nerve fibres.195 The Commission 
concluded that these neurotoxic effects cause “significant impairments in 
visual and verbal memory”196 and believed this damage to be long lasting, if 
not permanent.197 
The Commission acknowledged, however, that some studies 
suggested that any damage to SERT from MDMA use was temporary, 
citing a study that found “complete neuronal regeneration in rats [a mere] 
twelve months after they were exposed to MDMA.”198 The Commission’s 
report, however, discounted these studies by citing an opposing study 
immediately thereafter that found “damage to serotonin sites” in squirrel 
                                                 
 194. See, e.g., Margaret Benningfield & R.L. Cowan, Brain Sertotonin Function in 
MDMA (Ecstasy) Users: Evidence for Persisting Neurotoxicity, 38 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 253 (2008). 
 195. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 8–9 (citing George Ricaurte et al., 
(+ –) 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (‘Ecstasy’)-Induced Neurotoxicity: Studies in 
Animals, 42 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 5 (2000)). 
 196. Id. at 9; see supra note 165. 
 197. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 10 (citing G. Hatzidimitriou et al., 
Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the Forebrain of Monkeys Treated with MDMA 
Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE 
5096 (1999)). Ricuarte is named as the third author of this study. 
 198. Id. at 10 (citing George Battaglia et al., NIDA, MDMA-Induced Neurotoxicity: 
Parameters of Degeneration of Recovery of Brain Serotonin Neurons, 29 PHARMACOLOGY, 
BIOCHEMISTRY, & BEHAVIOR 269 (1988)). 
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monkeys that “persisted at least seven years after exposure” to MDMA.199 
Strangely, however, this study did not contain any information or 
discussion about whether behavioral or functional changes in the monkeys 
occurred.200 Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that SERT damage 
from MDMA use was, at minimum, long-lasting. 201 The Commission 
included little information about studies indicating that MDMA was either 
not neurotoxic or that any neurotoxic effects were temporary and 
insignificant. 
Studies have shown, however, that even after repeated exposure to 
high doses of MDMA, serotonin nerve fibres do regenerate over time, “with 
a gradual yet measurable increase in nerve fibredensity.”202 A 1993 study 
showed that “low dose therapeutic” doses of MDMA, taken biweekly for a 
period of four months, did not produce any lasting or functional effects.203 
More recently, a 2004 study found no statistically significant difference 
between the performance of MDMA users and non-users on 
neuropsychological tests.204 The study results showed that moderate users 
displayed “virtually no differences from non-users on any measures” of 
functional cognitive defects.205 This study has been corroborated by other 
studies.206 
Science shows, then, that any potential neurotoxicity is highly 
unlikely to be permanent or significant. This is of great importance, because 
the Commission’s decision assumed that neurological harm from 
neurotoxicity was permanent and would have tangible and significant 
consequences on vital functions like working memory, visual memory, and 
verbal memory.207 If neurological harm does not result in functional or 
lasting harm to users, the debate about neurotoxicity itself seems irrelevant, 
because the Commission aims not to evaluate scientifically interesting 
                                                 
 199. Id. (citing G. Hatzidimitriou, Altered Serotonin Innervation Patterns in the 
Forebrain of Monkeys Treated With MDMA Seven Years Previously: Factors Influencing 
Abnormal Recovery, 191 J. NEUROSCIENCE 5096 (1999)). 
 200. Grob, supra note 87, at 569 n.152. 
 201. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 10. 
 202. Grob, supra note 87, at 561 n.152 (citing M. E. Molliver et al., Neurotoxicity of 
MDMA & Related Compounds: Anatomic Studies, 600 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 649 
(1990)). 
 203. Id. at 563 (citing R. Karel, Fluoxetine May Protect Against MDMA Neurotoxicity 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Aug. 6, 1993)). The study noted that this fact was established by 
Ricaurte, who for political reasons or otherwise, never published this information in “the 
mainstream scientific literature.” 
 204. J. Halpern et al., Residual Neuropsychological Effects of Illicit 3,4-
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) in Individuals with Minimal Exposure to Other 
Drugs, 75 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 135 (2004). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See, e.g., Michael Lyvers & Penelope Hasking, Have Halpern et al. (2004) 
Detected ‘Residual Neuropsychological Effects’ of MDMA? Not Likely., 75 DRUG & 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 149 (2004). 
 207. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 9. 
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microbiological neurological changes, but rather aims to evaluate actual 
harm to users. 
4. Physiological Harms the Commission Ignored 
While modern scientific studies tend to reveal that MDMA is not as 
harmful as the Commission believed it to be in 2000, recent studies have 
also revealed a different harm that was not previously suspected: 
cardiotoxicity. Cardiotoxicity cannot justify a continued reliance on the 
current MDMA drug equivalency ratio due to the small number of affected 
users; however, this serves as yet another example of the Commission’s 
inadequate and incomplete 2001 analysis of the harms of MDMA. 
Recent scientific studies provide evidence that MDMA is 
cardiotoxic. Although the causal relationship between MDMA and 
myocardial fibrosis208 has not been conclusively proven in a controlled 
laboratory setting, MDMA users frequently present with myocardial 
fibrosis.209 This suggests that there may be a correlation between MDMA 
use and myocardial fibrosis. A causal relationship between the two will 
likely be exceptionally difficult to establish, however, since 
methamphetamine, a drug known to cause cardiac fibrosis, is often mixed 
with MDMA in ‘ecstasy’ tablets.210 There have also been reports of 
MDMA-related cardiomyopathy,211 although this, too, has not yet been 
replicated in a controlled laboratory setting.212 Recent science strongly 
supports the conclusion that MDMA can cause valvular heart disease. A 
2007 blind study tested twenty-nine MDMA users and twenty-nine non-
users who were age- and gender-matched.213 The study revealed that 
approximately one-third of the MDMA-users had abnormal 
echocardiograms, “compared with none in the control group.” 
                                                 
 208. Myocardial fibrosis, which is sometimes referred to as cardiac fibrosis, occurs 
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Although MDMA can likely cause heart disease, modern science 
also has shown that valvular heart disease is reversible and that the number 
of MDMA users who actually present with this disease “is so low as to 
hardly be worth a mention.”214 As such, MDMA’s potential cardiotoxicity 
cannot justify continued use of the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio 
without further reevaluation from the Commission. 
B. The Commission’s Social Concerns 
In addition to being based on empirical evidence about MDMA’s 
physiological harms, the Commission’s 2001 decision was also based on 
numerous social concerns. Recent data supports the Commission’s findings 
and concerns about the prevalence of MDMA usage among the nation’s 
youth, the general rise in popularity of MDMA use, and the increase in 
MDMA trafficking patterns; however the data does not support the 
Commission’s ranking of MDMA’s social harms relative to other illicit 
drugs, such as cocaine. A review of both current and then-existing data 
clearly shows that, on the whole, cocaine is much more harmful than 
MDMA. Despite this, MDMA’s drug equivalency ratio is 250% higher than 
cocaine’s. Because the Commission’s 2001 decision was primarily based on 
a comparison of MDMA to cocaine and heroin, the fact that cocaine is 
much more harmful than MDMA clearly shows that the current MDMA 
ratio is fatally flawed. 
1. Harm to America’s Youth 
Although recent data generally supports the Commission’s 
concerns about MDMA perception and use among the nation’s youth 
demographic, a comparison of youth perception and use of MDMA and 
youth perception and use of drugs such as cocaine and marijuana show that 
this concern cannot justify MDMA’s current 500:1 ratio. 
The Commission’s report states that the Commission was 
concerned about MDMA’s impact on the nation’s youth demographic. This 
concern was justified by data that revealed “sharp increases in MDMA use 
among all grade levels, as well as young adults in their early 20s,” as well 
as with the availability of the drug to the youth.215 The Commission was 
also concerned with the fact that MDMA was being marketed toward the 
youth in the rave circuit and in schools, commonly with “brand” or 
“designer” names imprinted on the MDMA, as well as with the youth’s 
perception of MDMA as a low-risk “feel good” drug.216 
Recent data suggests that the Commission’s concern about the 
youth’s perception of MDMA was valid. Statistics show a sharp decrease in 
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 215. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 13, 15. 
 216. Id. at 15. 
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the percentage of eighth through twelfth graders who perceive MDMA use 
as harmful.217 In fact, the percentage of eighth and tenth graders who 
perceive MDMA as harmful is lower than it was in 2001, with only 25% of 
eighth graders and 37% of tenth graders seeing great risk in trying 
ecstasy.218 Also supporting the Commission’s concern is data revealing that 
the perception of the harmfulness of cocaine is much higher than that of 
MDMA: 43% of eighth graders and 53% of tenth graders thought trying 
powder cocaine once or twice involved great risk.219 
MDMA usage among teens and young adults also remains 
prevalent. Recent statistics show that MDMA use among the youth 
demographic may, once again, be on the rise. The percentage of twelfth-
grade MDMA users declined by more than 50% in the aftermath of harsher 
MDMA guidelines; however, use among twelfth graders has gradually risen 
since 2005.220 Since 2005, there has been a “modest rebound” in MDMA 
use among middle school and high school students, and in 2010 there was a 
“significant increase [in MDMA use]” in eighth and tenth grade.”221 
According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment authored by the 
National Drug Intelligence Center, “MDMA use is increasing, reaching the 
highest levels of use since 2002.”222 “Clearly the very substantial decline in 
ecstasy use has ended, and we may be seeing a rebound in the use of this 
drug” among teenagers.223 
Despite these increased rates of use, however, MDMA use among 
teens does not justify the 500:1 ratio when compared with other types of 
drug use among teens. In 2012, 2% of eighth graders, 5% of tenth graders, 
and 7.2% of twelfth graders reported having used MDMA at least one 
time.224 The number of teens who had used cocaine was lower, but not 
drastically lower, with 1.9% of eighth graders, 3.3% of tenth graders, and 
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4.9% of twelfth graders reporting having previously used cocaine.225 Data 
from 2011 also reveals similar rates of use of MDMA and cocaine. In 2011, 
2.6% of eighth graders, 6.6% of tenth graders, and 8% of twelfth graders 
said that they had previously used MDMA.226 Again, the number of teens 
who had used cocaine was lower, but not drastically lower: 2.2% of eighth 
graders, 3.3% of tenth graders, and 5.2% of twelfth graders admitted using 
cocaine previously.227 Further, in 2013 the DEA reported an overall decline 
in MDMA use among the youth demographic since 2010.228 Most 
compelling, however, is data about the number of teens who have 
previously used marijuana—which carries a Guidelines penalty 500 times 
lower than MDMA: 16.4% of eighth graders, 34.5% of tenth graders, and 
45.5% of twelfth graders reported having previously used marijuana.229 
2. Emergency Room Data 
Emergency room data concerning young MDMA users may 
generally support the Commission’s concerns about MDMA’s effect on 
teens and young adults, as well as its concerns about an increase in MDMA 
use. Current data, however, continues to show that cocaine, which carries a 
significantly smaller Guidelines penalty, results in a much greater 
percentage of serious bodily injury and emergency room visits. 
MDMA-related emergency room visits have increased by 114% 
from 2004 through 2010.230 The increase was gradual from 2004-2010, but 
“appear[s] to [have] stabilize[d] between 2009 and 2010.”231 Estimates for 
2011 MDMA-related emergency room visits also support the notion that 
this number is stabilizing.232 The vast majority of these MDMA-related 
emergency room visits occurred among 12 to 24 year-olds, while the 
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majority of cocaine-related visits occurred among those who were 25 years 
of age and older.233 
Compared to users of other drugs, however, MDMA users present 
to the emergency room much less frequently.234 The Commission itself 
noted that “emergency room admission and deaths attributed to use of 
[MDMA] continue to be less frequent than with other drugs of abuse.”235 In 
fact, MDMA-related emergency room visits comprise only 1.9% of drug-
related emergency room visits.236 Cocaine-related emergency room visits, 
on the other hand, were much more frequent than MDMA-related 
emergency room visits.237 In people twenty-one years of age or older, 
cocaine-related visits comprised 210.7 visits per 100,000 population, as 
opposed to MDMA-related visits which comprised only 4.7 visits per 
100,000 people.238 In people who were twenty years of age or younger, 
cocaine-related ER visits comprised 23.8 visits per 100,000 people as 
opposed to MDMA-related visits which comprised only 12.9 visits per 
100,000 people.239 Even heroin-related visits surpassed MDMA-related 
visits, with 93 visits per 100,000 people who were twenty-one years of age 
or older and 21.2 visits per 100,000 people twenty years of age or 
younger.240 MDMA-related emergency room visits also occur much less 
frequently than emergency room visits related to alcohol, amphetamines, 
marijuana and PCP.241 In conclusion, emergency-room related data, while 
supporting the Commission’s concerns, does not support the Commission’s 
treatment of MDMA relative to other illicit drugs. 
3. Drug Trafficking Patterns 
The Commission, through its report, expressed concern about the 
increase of illegal MDMA trafficking and importation by both individuals 
and drug trafficking organizations.242 The Commission also shared the 
DEA’s concerns about future increases in MDMA trafficking due to 
MDMA’s “easy manufacture, relatively benign reputation, and huge 
                                                 
 233. DAWN, supra note 230, at 34, tbl. 6 (12–24 year-olds comprised 72.3% of 
MDMA-related emergency room visits while 86% of cocaine-related emergency room visits 
involved patients who were 25 years of age or older). 
 234. Id. at 34, tbl. 6. 
 235. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 11. 
 236. DAWN, supra note 230, at 4, fig.1. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. PCP, or phencyclidine, is an illegal drug that can cause illusions, auditory 
hallucinations, “feelings of strength, anxiety, aggression, . . . hostility, . . . delusions, 
paranoia, and catatonia.” NAT’L DRUG INTEL. CTR., INTEL. BULLETIN: PCP: INCREASING 
AVAILABILITY AND ABUSE (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs8/
8180/. 
 242. GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS, supra note 48, at 12. 
300 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1: 267 
markup,” noting that “the MDMA business has even proved irresistible to 
many not otherwise involved in drugs.”243 Although MDMA trafficking 
declined immediately after the 2001 MDMA guidelines were established, 
there was a significant increase in MDMA trafficking from 2007 through 
2010. Data from 2007 through 2010 “shows high levels of MDMA 
seizures” in the United States, with more than 15.1 million MDMA dosage 
units seized.244 “The amount of MDMA seized along the Northern Border 
increased overall from more than 1.9 million tablets in FY2006 to more 
than 3.9 million tablets in FY2010, the greatest amount seized in the past 5 
years.”245 Further, “the average load size of these seizures” was continuing 
to increase.246 Data in 2011 also revealed an increase in trafficking activity 
in the Southwest Border region, where MDMA seizures almost tripled from 
2009, when 547,707 tablets were seized, to 2010, when 1,545,607 tablets 
were seized.247 
Recently, however, MDMA trafficking has sharply declined. The 
DEA reported that only 173,749 dosage units and 390 kilograms of MDMA 
were seized in 2012, which was “significantly less than the approximately 
1.9 million dosage units and 675 kilograms seized in 2011.”248 In its 2013 
National Drug Threat Assessment report, the DEA summarized its findings 
by concluding that “surveys, seizure and treatment data suggest availability 
and abuse of [MDMA] may have peaked.”249 This recent data indicates that 
the Commission’s concerns about future increases in MDMA trafficking, 
although valid in 2000, are no longer supported by data about MDMA 
trafficking and availability. 
Production of MDMA within the United States has increased over 
the past decade. The 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment stated that the 
rise of Asian and Mexican criminal organizations have resulted in high 
levels of MDMA production and availability in the United States.250 
Despite a rise in MDMA production, however, there are still a relatively 
“small amount” of MDMA laboratories in the United States.251 2013 data 
indicating a low level of MDMA availability throughout the United States 
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supports the conclusion that MDMA production within the United States 
remains small.252 
Just as the recent decrease in MDMA trafficking calls into question 
the validity of the Commission’s concerns about MDMA drug trafficking 
patterns, the Commission’s treatment of MDMA relative to cocaine is also 
unjustified. Even before the sharp decrease in MDMA trafficking, MDMA 
trafficking made up a much smaller percentage of trafficking than other 
drugs, “including cannabis, cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin.”253 
Further, MDMA trafficking is not associated with violence, unlike cocaine 
trafficking, which primarily occurs through Hispanic gangs who largely 
control the market through intimidation and force.254 
C. Federal Court Split 
Problems with the basis for the Commission’s decision to enact a 
500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio have not gone unnoticed. Recently, 
defendants across the country have been challenging the MDMA 
guidelines. Since 2011, several federal district courts have wrestled with the 
problem, resulting in a disagreement among the courts about how to 
properly handle the issue. Some federal district courts have deviated from 
the Guidelines’ MDMA ratio on the grounds that the 500:1 ratio is 
empirically unsupportable; these courts have elected to apply substantially 
lower MDMA drug equivalency ratios.255 Other federal district courts, 
however, have declined to reject the Guidelines’ ratio due to sentencing 
uniformity concerns as well as concerns about the amount of judicial 
resources required to properly review all of the relevant scientific data.256 
Federal appellate courts have not overturned decisions to deviate from or 
decisions to adhere to the Guidelines ratio. Because of the deference given 
to sentencing judges in the appellate review process, the federal district 
court split will likely remain until the Commission reevaluates the current 
MDMA ratio. 
1. Deviation from the 500:1 MDMA Drug Equivalency Ratio 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York was the first of the federal district courts to grapple with the issue of 
whether the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio would result in “a 
sentence that is greater than necessary to serve the objectives of 
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sentencing.”257 In United States v. McCarthy, the court held an extensive 
evidentiary hearing in which it heard expert testimony from four expert 
witnesses regarding the soundness and validity of the empirical studies on 
which the MDMA drug equivalency ratio was based.258 The court 
determined that some of the Commission’s findings were valid. For 
example, the court stated that recent scientific research had not 
compromised the Commission’s findings about MDMA’s neurotoxicity to 
the extent that they were undoubtedly false.259 The court also found the 
Commission’s findings “that MDMA is uniquely marketed to—and 
prevalent within—the younger population” to be valid.260 
The court was not, however, persuaded as to the validity of all of 
the Commission’s findings. The court also noted that the Commission 
incorrectly characterized MDMA as a hallucinogen,261 and took issue with 
the Commission’s comparison of MDMA to cocaine.262 The court 
specifically mentioned the fact that: (1) there are far more cocaine-related 
emergency room visits than there are MDMA-related emergency room 
visits; (2) cocaine use causes health risks not caused by MDMA use, such 
as “cardiovascular effects, including disturbances in heart rhythm and heart 
attacks; respiratory effects, such as chest pain and respiratory failure; and 
neurological effects, including strokes and seizures”; and (3) cocaine 
trafficking, unlike MDMA tracking, is connected with “substantial 
violence.”263 The court concluded that the Commission’s comparison of the 
relative impacts of MDMA and cocaine was “selective and incomplete”: 
“For example, instead of comparing the full range of the health effects of 
MDMA and cocaine, the Commission focused only on a single health 
effect: neurotoxicity. In doing so, the Commission ignored several effects 
of cocaine that render it significantly more harmful than MDMA.”264 
The court further stated that the Commission’s flawed comparison 
of MDMA to cocaine rendered the Guidelines’ MDMA penalties 
“incompatible with the goal of uniform sentencing based on empirical 
data.”265 Specifically, the Court felt that when “disparate drug equivalencies 
are established for similar narcotics based on an incomplete analysis,” the 
fundamental “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct” is “violated.”266 
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Although the court disagreed with the Commission’s MDMA 
penalties, it also rejected the defendant’s request of either a 1:1 ratio or the 
“pre-2001 ratio of 35:1,” deferring “to the Commission’s determination . . . 
that the pre-2001 MDMA Guidelines were too low.”267 The court noted 
that, although there are several ways in which MDMA is less harmful than 
cocaine, there are also unique dangers associated with MDMA use.268 
Ultimately, the court chose to adopt a 200:1 marijuana-to-MDMA drug 
equivalency ratio, “equal to that of cocaine.”269 
Less than seven months later, in United States v. Qayyem, another 
district court judge in the Southern District of New York declined to apply 
the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio.270 The court reviewed anew the 
current scientific research about MDMA but also stated that it “relie[d] 
heavily upon the evidentiary findings set forth in McCarthy.”271 The court 
expressed many of the same concerns about the Commission’s comparison 
of MDMA and cocaine expressed by the McCarthy court, such as the 
Commission’s failure “to compare MDMA to cocaine using the same five-
factor rubric” it used in its comparison of MDMA and heroin, the lesser 
violence associated with MDMA trafficking as opposed to cocaine 
trafficking, and the Commission’s faulty categorization of MDMA as a 
hallucinogen.272 In addition to these concerns, the Qayyem court 
emphasized that MDMA was not nearly as addictive as cocaine, citing to a 
study that found that “MDMA consistently ranked in the bottom quartile of 
all three major categories of harm.”273 These categories included “(1) 
physical harm to the individual user; (2) the tendency of the drug to induce 
physical and psychological dependence; and (3) social harm, defined as the 
effect of drug use on families, communities, and society.”274 
Although the court disagreed with much of the Commission’s 
analysis, the court did agree with the Commission’s concerns about 
“[MDMA’s] potential neurotoxicity, coupled with its popularity among 
youth.”275 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that the 500:1 ratio 
“chosen by the Commission does not accurately reflect the then-existing 
research, nor is it supported by more recent evidence.”276 The court 
declined to apply the 100:1 drug equivalency ratio requested by the 
defendant in this case, but, on the grounds that the 500:1 ratio was “greater 
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than necessary to serve the objectives of sentencing,” the Qayyem court, 
like the McCarthy court, adopted a 200:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio 
instead.277 
2. Adherence to the 500:1 MDMA Drug Equivalency Ratio 
Not all courts have agreed with the decision to adopt a 200:1 
marijuana-to-MDMA drug equivalency ratio, however. In United States v. 
Kamper, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee upheld the current 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio, rejecting 
the defendant’s request to reduce the ratio.278 The Court declined the chance 
to “categorically reject” and replace the MDMA drug equivalency ratio, 
reasoning that the Commission, not the court, is in the best position to make 
this decision.279 The court emphasized that the Sentencing Commission is in 
a better position to determine an appropriate drug equivalency ratio for 
MDMA, because the determination necessarily involves the review and 
consideration of extensive scientific data, value judgments about the 
relative harm of MDMA, and national public policy issues.280 The court 
explained that “an individual federal district court judge simply cannot 
marshal resources akin to those available to the Commission for tackling 
the manifold issues involved with determining a proper drug 
equivalency.281 
The court in Kamper also expressed great concern about the 
inherent administrative problems with a “reject-and-replace approach”—the 
exact approach for which the defendant in this case argues: 
Federal law provides for 667 district court judgeships. 
Under [the defendant’s] approach, every single one of these 
judges could reject the MDMA-to-marijuana ratio under 
the Guidelines and replace that ratio. . . . This approach 
would almost certainly produce the kind of unwarranted 
sentencing disparities § 3553 attempts to avoid. 
A sentence for an MDMA defendant would be based not on 
the facts and laws of each case, but on the ratio employed 
by the particular sentencing judge, where even different 
judges in the same courthouse could rely on different 
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ratios. In the face of such a haphazard process, the public 
would rightfully lose respect for the courts.282 
Finally, the court also expressed concerns with regard to proper 
separation of powers.283 The court believed that the defendant, by 
requesting that the court abandon the 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio, 
was “in essence ask[ing] the Court to step into the shoes of Congress and 
the Commission and legislate a change to the drug equivalency table under 
the Guidelines.”284 Noting that the decision in Kimbrough “did not alter this 
fundamental structural principle” of separation of powers, the court 
expressed its unwillingness to deviate from the Guidelines and create a new 
MDMA drug equivalency ratio.285 
Just two weeks after Kamper, a federal district court judge in the 
Southern District of Illinois similarly declined to deviate from the 
Commission’s 500:1 MDMA drug equivalency ratio.286 The judge admitted 
that there is “considerable uncertainty . . . as to the science and policies 
underlying the marijuana-to-MDMA ratio,”287 but he deferred to the 
Commission’s ratio anyway, simply stating that the defendant’s “arguments 
that the current MDMA Guideline/ratio is unworthy of application-across-
the-board or in this particular case” were unpersuasive.288 His decision to 
defer to the Commission in this instance appears to be based, in part, on the 
fact that he “has considerably less experience with MDMA cases than 
cocaine cases.”289 The judge believed this to be relevant “in that [a] Judge 
may defer more to the Commission in less familiar territory.”290 The Court 
also emphasized that, although it would be permitted to “delve into the 
history of a guideline or review and assess the deliberative process of the 
Commission in establishing that guideline in order to properly sentence a 
defendant,” it was not required to do so.291 
Despite the Court’s adherence to the 500:1 MDMA ratio, however, 
the court declared that, “[a]t some point in the future, there may be an 
appropriate case in which to consider afresh whether deviation from the 
MDMA Guidelines is merited based on new development, research, or 
caselaw.”292 
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In June of 2012, the Federal District Court of the Western District 
of Michigan declined to reduce a defendant’s sentence by recalculating the 
sentencing using the 200:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio adopted by the 
McCarthy court.293 The court reasoned that the discovery of new scientific 
data merely creates an argument that the court should deviate from the 
Commission’s guidelines, which does not raise an issue of “constitutional 
magnitude,” nor does it “render the entire proceedings invalid.”294 In late 
2012, United States v. Thannavong, a federal district court in the Middle 
District of Tennessee followed in the footsteps of the Kamper court, also 
upholding the current 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA ratio.295 The district court 
in Thannavong based its decision, however, on “the large extent of the drug 
conspiracy, the national scope, the amount of money, and the large quantity 
of marijuana” involved.296 
3. Adherence/Deviation: An Abuse of Discretion? 
To date, the Sixth Circuit,297 Seventh Circuit,298 and Tenth 
Circuit299 have reviewed the application of the 500:1 marijuana-to-MDMA 
ratio, and all three courts held that the application of the 500:1 ratio is not 
unreasonable. In United States v. Ferguson, the Defendant appealed his 
sentence, arguing, “[T]he District Court’s application of the 1:500 ratio was 
unreasonable in light of empirical data suggesting that the ratio is unduly 
harsh and otherwise lacks justification.”300 The Tenth Circuit, reviewing for 
abuse of discretion, upheld the district court’s decision to apply the 500:1 
MDMA drug equivalency ratio.301 The court stated a sentencing judge has 
discretion to deviate from the “advisory conversions” of the Guidelines 
when he or she “disagrees with the policy or harshness” of the advisory 
                                                 
 293. Hughes v. United States, 1:11-CV-1028, 2012 WL 1981715 at *1, *3 (W.D. Mich. 
June 1, 2012). 
 294. Id. at *1–*2 (citing Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 
2005)). The court also denied the defendant’s motion, which was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
because the defendant had not filed his motion within the one-year statute of limitations and 
because, “[w]hen the claimed error is a constitutional error, § 2255 affords relief only when 
the error has a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the proceedings.” Id. 
 295. 533 F. App’x 589, 592 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied No. 13–7438, 2014 WL 
102832 (2014). 
 296. Id. at 593. Specifically, during the sentencing hearing, the district court judge said, 
“It wasn’t just Ecstasy, it was marijuana. It wasn’t just one transaction, there were many. It 
was national, interstate, in structure, in transactions, lots of money, weapons. And to me, 
that’s a different set of dangers separate and apart from just the fact that Ecstasy is involved 
and the Commission thinks it’s 500. For purposes of sentencing here, it’s the facts of the 
offense and the commercial aspects of the offense that, to me, take it outside the scope of this 
policy differences on health effects of health dangers of Ecstasy.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 297. Thannavong, 533 F. App’x at 592; Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d at 610. 
 298. United States v. Scott, 527 F. App’x 539 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 299. United States v. Ferguson, 447 F. App’x 898, 902 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 300. Id. at 902–03. 
 301. Id. 
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penalty.302 The court nevertheless emphasized that the fact that judges are 
permitted to deviate from the Guidelines does not make it “an abuse of 
discretion for a judge to adhere to the equivalency table, policy critiques 
notwithstanding.”303 The Tenth Circuit, however, made no commentary 
about the appropriateness of the MDMA drug equivalency ratio itself.304 
In United States v. Thannavong, the Sixth Circuit also upheld the 
district court’s decision to apply the 500:1 MDMA ratio.305 In its opinion, 
the court highlighted “the fact that a district judge may disagree with a 
guideline for policy reasons and may reject the Guidelines range because of 
that disagreement does not mean the court must reject the Guidelines range 
if it disagrees.”306 The Sixth Circuit, however, conceded that, “in an 
appropriate case,” the 500:1 MDMA-to-marijuana ratio may “overstate[] 
the nature of the offense and the need for the sentence imposed.”307 Finally, 
the Seventh Circuit upheld an application of the 500:1 ratio where the 
district court failed to address the defendant’s argument that the ratio was 
inappropriate.308 The court stated that the district court was not obligated 
“to answer the abstract policy argument that the ratio defined in the Drug 
Equivalency Table is unworthy of application in any case . . . .”309 
Because abuse of discretion is the standard of review for sentencing 
decisions, it is highly unlikely that any federal appellate court will overturn 
a lower court’s application of the Commission’s current MDMA drug 
equivalency ratio. Even if an appellate court expressed doubt about the 
validity of the Commission’s basis for the ratio, such commentary would be 
mere dicta and would not have any binding effect on the lower courts. It is, 
therefore, highly unlikely that arguments to the federal appellate courts will 
result in a solution to the current problem with the MDMA guidelines. 
IV. A CALL FOR REEVALUATION 
The many errors made by the Commission in formulating the 
current MDMA drug equivalency ratio render the current ratio questionable 
at best. The unresolved federal district court split, as previously detailed in 
Part III, threatens horizontal sentencing uniformity. Further, considerable 
judicial resources have already been used to analyze scientific research and 
expert testimony in an attempt to draw a proper conclusion about the harms 
                                                 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. 533 F. App’x 589, 593 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 306. Id. (quoting United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis 
in original)). 
 307. Id. The Court also noted that the “[a]ppellant bears a heavy burden in seeking 
reversal of a district court’s decision to reject a categorical attack on the sentencing formula 
promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. 
 308. United States v. Scott, 527 F. App’x 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 309. Id. (citations omitted). 
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of MDMA use and trafficking. The erroneous foundation of the current 
MDMA penalties, combined with the federal district court split and the 
need for judicial efficiency, mandate a prompt reevaluation of the current 
MDMA drug equivalency ratio by the Commission. 
In light of the new knowledge about the physiological harms that 
can be gleaned from modern science, as well as the disagreement among 
district courts, the U.S. Sentencing Commission should promptly reevaluate 
the current MDMA drug equivalency ratio.310 Without reevaluation, the 
future inevitably will consist of the use of an inordinate amount of judicial 
resources spent on determining proper equivalency ratios, an ever-
increasing amount of appeals of MDMA-related sentencing decisions, and 
increasing instances of sentencing disparity among defendants. 
A reexamination of the MDMA Guidelines would not necessarily 
have to—but, based on current data, likely should—lead to a reduction of 
the MDMA penalties. The importance of a well-founded, well-reasoned 
drug equivalency ratio far outweighs the importance of the actual outcome 
of the reevaluation itself. A reexamination of the MDMA Guidelines will 
require the Commission to perform a new analysis of the scientific research 
about the physical harms of MDMA and a new analysis of the social 
policies and rationale behind MDMA penalties. Ideally, the Commission 
should not start from its 2001 decision, but rather should start fresh and 
focus solely on the most credible data available. The Commission should 
perform a complete analysis of how the harms of MDMA compare to the 
harms of other drugs such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, etc. 
The Commission must reexamine the MDMA drug equivalency 
ratio because there are no other satisfactory alternative remedies. The 
current district court split will only grow. Courts do not have the resources 
of the Commission to develop empirically-supported Guidelines, because 
extensive fact-finding and specialized expertise is required to make 
informed decisions about drug equivalency ratios. Courts may end up using 
an inordinate amount of judicial resources to develop Guidelines, which is 
an extraordinarily inefficient use of judicial resources. If courts do not use 
adequate resources when implementing their own MDMA ratio, however, 
there is a large risk that the courts will apply disproportionate ratios. 
Alternatively, courts that decline to implement a new ratio because of the 
administrative problems will continue to implement sentences that are 
greater than necessary to adequately protect the public, serve as an effective 
deterrent, and provide sufficient retribution.311 Not only is this 
fundamentally unfair, but it flies in the face of the statutory sentencing 
policies set forth in § 3553(a). 
                                                 
 310. There is also an apparent need for further scientific studies about and evaluation of 
the effects of MDMA. Further studies should specifically control for extraneous variables 
such as simultaneous polydrug use, adulterated MDMA tablets, and extensive prior abuse of 
illicit substances. 
 311. See U.S.C. 18 § 3553(a) (2012). 
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Blatant problems with the crack-cocaine Guidelines remained in 
place for twenty years, because Congress (and, for quite some time, the 
Commission) refused to act to solve the problem. The implementation of 
fundamentally unfair crack cocaine sentences for two decades led to “one 
of the greatest stains on our federal criminal justice system.”312 The current 
MDMA Guidelines have been in place for over twelve years. It is time. 
Both the Commission313 and Congress have the authority to reexamine the 
MDMA Guidelines, and yet neither body has given any indication that it 
intends to tackle the problem. In order to avoid repeating its past mistakes, 
it is imperative that the Commission promptly reevaluate the current 
MDMA sentencing policies. 
 
   
                                                 
 312. Cratty, supra note 4. 
 313. The Commission has an ongoing responsibility to review and refine the 
Guidelines. 
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